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The authors of th is article are Sofía Galán and Sergio Puente of the Directorate General Economics, Statistics
and Research.1
The existence of a mandatory minimum wage is widespread among developed countries, 
the main aim being to enhance social equity. From a strictly economic standpoint, how-
ever, the theoretical literature emphasises that a minimum wage can also have an adverse 
impact on employment for certain groups of workers, especially those whose productivity 
level is below the minimum wage set by the authorities. In empirical terms, the studies 
available are not fully conclusive on the size and significance of this possible impact. 
Some studies find that increases in the minimum wage do not have a significantly adverse 
effect on employment [for example, Card and Krueger (1994 and 1995) for the US labour 
market],2 whereas others find that they do [Neumark and Wascher (2000)]. For the case of 
Spain, in general the available studies show that there are adverse effects on younger 
workers, while for all other workers the findings are generally negligible [see, for example, 
Dolado et al (1996)].
In this setting, the increases in the minimum wage seen in Spain between 2004 and 2010 
provide an interesting case study for a more in-depth empirical analysis of this issue. The 
data contained in the Social Security Administrative Labour Records (Muestra Continua de 
Vidas Laborales, hereinafter MCVL), which are the data used here, are particularly useful 
for this purpose, as they provide detailed individual information on workers’ employment 
histories. The article is structured as follows: the second section summarises the develop-
ment of the minimum wage in Spain in recent decades and compares it with the situation 
in other European countries; the third section briefly explains the methodology employed 
to analyse the impact of the recent increases in the minimum wage and describes the key 
findings; and the fourth section summarises the main conclusions.
A minimum wage3 was first established in Spain in 1964, but it was not until 1980 that a 
national minimum wage (salario mínimo interprofesional) was introduced. Since then, it has 
been set each year by the government, following consultation with the social partners, 
taking into account the change in the CPI, the average productivity of the Spanish econo-
my, the increase in income from work as a share of national income and the economic 
situation, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of the Workers’ Statute.
Initially three age bands were set for the minimum wage: one for workers under 17, a sec-
ond for 17-year-olds and a third for workers over 17. However, since 1998, there has been 
just one national minimum wage for workers of all ages. As regards its recent develop-
ment, as from the year 2000 the national minimum wage was raised annually by 2%, a 
figure that coincided with the ECB inflation target. However, in July 2004 the national 
minimum wage was increased by 6.6%, followed by a further 4.8% at the start of 2005, 
resulting in a cumulative leap of 11.4% in a single year. Subsequently, it continued to rise 
at a faster pace than the annual change in CPI. Overall, the national minimum wage went 
from €460.5 per month in 2004 to €633.3 in 2010, that is, a cumulative increase of 37.5% 
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1  This article is a summary of Working Paper No. 1237.
2  Machin and Manning (1997) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006) offer similar findings for European countries.
3  The national minimum wage is the minimum remuneration to be received by a worker for statutory working hours 
in any sector of activity, with no distinction by gender, age, type of contract, etc.
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in that period. In 2011 the national minimum wage was raised by 1.3% and in 2012 it was 
frozen, at €641.4 per month.
Traditionally, the percentage of workers affected by the national minimum wage has been 
relatively low in Spain [see, for example, Dolado and Felgueroso (1997)], although the 
definition of workers who are considered affected often differs between studies and es-
sentially depends on the information available according to the database used. In this 
article, the workers affected by increases in the national minimum wage are defined as 
those whose wages in a given year are lower than the following year’s national minimum 
wage.4 For this group of workers, increases in the national minimum wage are binding. 
Using this definition, and with the information obtained from the MCVL, the percentage of 
workers affected by the national minimum wage in Spain is quite low (see Table 1). Spe-
cifically, in each of the years analysed, the annual increases in the national minimum wage 
affected only 0.6% to 0.9% of all workers; however, this figure rises to 2% in the case of 
younger workers.
One determinant factor behind the limited impact of the national minimum wage on the 
Spanish labour market is the existence of minimum bargained wages which are higher 
than the national minimum wage.5 Indeed, as can be seen in Chart 2, collective bargained 
wages, proxied by the base wage estimated by the Wage Structure Survey (Encuesta de 
Estructura Salarial),6 clearly reduce the direct impact of the national minimum wage as they 
are higher, even for the least skilled workers.7 The chart also shows how the changes in the 
national minimum wage between 2002 and 2010 seem to have been passed through to the 
collective bargained wage distribution, as over time the 10th, 25th and 50th wage percen-
tiles have moved in parallel to the increases in the national minimum wage. This implies 
SOURCE: INE.
a Minimum wage in nominal terms.
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4  This analysis excludes highly-skilled workers, defined as those included in contribution groups 1 to 3, who by 
definition will rarely be affected by increases in the national minimum wage. Moreover, wages are considered in 
real terms, that is, both individual wages and the national minimum wage are CPI-deflated. Lastly, a 12-month 
period is used to avoid seasonality problems.
5  Dolado et al (1997) record a similar finding for the 1980s and early 1990s, a period in which the gap between the 
national minimum wage and minimum bargained wages actually widened.
6  The methodology used by this survey defines the base wage as the essential and fixed part of the minimum re-
muneration agreed in collective bargaining agreements.
7  The chart shows the 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles of the base wage distribution for unskilled workers with less 
than one year’s service, which is potentially the group most affected by the national minimum wage.
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that, although only a low percentage of workers is directly affected by the national mini-
mum wage in Spain, a large percentage is indirectly affected by it, as a result of the collec-
tive bargaining process.
An international comparison (see Table 2) shows that, as a percentage of the average 
wage, the Spanish national minimum wage amounted to 32.9% in 2003 and to a high of 
36.5% in 2007, below the figures for countries such as France, Belgium or Luxembourg.
To assess the impact the recent increases in the national minimum wage have had on 
employment, the MCVL8 provided by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security has 
been used. This database contains administrative records from the Social Security system 
and the Municipal Registers, with detailed individual information on workers’ employment 
histories. Specifically, the different waves available (2004 to 2010) contain a sample of 4% 
of the population who have had at least one relationship with the Social Security system in 
the year.9 In consequence, combining the waves available provides a highly representative 
sample of the entire population, excluding persons who have not been part of the labour 
Estimated impact
of the minimum wage
on employment in Spain
SOURCE: Social Security Administrative Labour Records (MCVL).
a The 2009 ?gure refers only to the period January-March, since as from April the national minimum wage declined year-on-year in real terms.
TOTAL 16-24 25-32 33-45 46-64
2004 0.88 1.74 1.01 0.69 0.63
2005 0.78 1.53 0.85 0.64 0.59
2006 0.76 1.48 0.79 0.64 0.62
2007 0.59 1.14 0.58 0.53 0.50
2008 0.93 2.06 0.87 0.83 0.77
2009 (a) 0.14 0.27 0.58 0.51 0.11
Age groups
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS AFFECTED BY THE REAL MINIMUM WAGE, BY AGE GROUP TABLE 1
SOURCE: INE.
a Unskilled workers in services and labourers in all other sectors.
COMPARISON BETWEEN COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED WAGES AND THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE (a) CHART 2 
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8  For workers in contribution groups 4 to 11 the minimum mandatory Social Security contribution, recorded in this 
database, is exactly one-twelfth of the gross annual national minimum wage, and thus permits a direct com-
parison.
9  This may be an employment relationship, or it may be, for example, unemployment benefit.
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force at any time in the period 2004-2010. The database includes information on individu-
al characteristics, such as gender, age or nationality, along with variables relating to the 
employment relationship, such as wages, type of contract, sector of activity or length of 
service.
Table 3 depicts the probability of workers losing their employment, drawing a distinction 
between the group of workers that may be affected by increases in real terms in the mini-
mum wage, as defined above, and all other workers. It shows that between 2000 and 
2006, the likelihood of workers in the second group losing their employment was between 
8% and 9%, while the figure was much higher for workers potentially affected by increas-
es in the minimum wage. Naturally, since the onset of the crisis, this probability has risen 
very significantly for the second group, reaching 15.1% in 2008. In any case, the most 
striking finding is that the likelihood of the group of workers affected by increases in the 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belgium 47.6 46.2 45.5 45.7 45.5 45.3 ... ... 44.7 ...
Bulgaria 38.8 40.4 41.4 46.6 44.7 42.1 39.5 38.3 35.8 33.7
Czech Republic 36.9 38.1 38.4 39.1 39.7 38.1 35.2 34.0 33.3 32.5
Estonia 30.5 32.4 34.6 33.2 30.5 30.4 34.9 36.2 35.6 33.8
Ireland ... 43.4 ... ... 39.7 38.6 38.0 41.5 41.8 41.9
Greece 54.7 48.8 47.7 48.7 47.7 46.4 48.4 50.7 40.4 50.1
Spain 33.5 32.9 33.6 35.1 35.8 36.5 35.2 35.1 35.3 34.6
France ... ... ... ... ... 46.9 47.3 47.9 47.4 ...
Latvia 37.4 39.9 41.9 36.2 33.3 34.2 36.2 40.9 42.2 45.1
Lithuania 43.7 42.1 45.4 44.9 42.1 38.7 39.6 40.5 42.0 41.1
Luxembourg 45.5 46.6 46.0 46.8 46.2 46.8 ... 45.4 45.9 46.7
Hungary 42.1 42.2 41.2 41.3 41.7 39.8 38.5 38.6 38.8 39.1
Malta 44.9 48.2 47.4 50.5 50.4 49.0 48.8 45.2 46.2 47.4
Netherlands 49.3 47.7 46.1 45.5 44.1 44.2 44.2 44.1 44.6 ...
Poland 33.0 33.9 35.1 33.7 36.1 32.4 35.7 39.7 40.4 38.3
Portugal 43.0 40.7 40.0 40.5 40.7 41.6 44.6 43.2 42.8 42.6
Romania 31.3 37.3 34.4 32.6 30.2 29.1 30.1 33.3 32.3 35.8
Slovenia 45.3 45.8 45.9 46.2 45.2 43.4 41.0 41.1 47.5 50.0
Slovakia 32.4 34.0 34.1 34.4 34.8 34.7 36.5 36.6 36.6
United Kingdom 34.6 34.5 36.5 37.9 37.9 38.9 38.1 38.4 38.2 38.5
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON: THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE AVERAGE WAGE TABLE 2
  
SOURCE: Eurostat. 
...
SOURCE: Social Security Administrative Labour Records (MCVL).
a Employment losses are observed on a 12-month horizon. In 2009 only the period January-March is included, since as from April the minimum wage declined. 
b Between 2000 and 2003 there are no workers affected as there were no increases in real terms in the national minimum wage.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Workers affected (b) NA NA NA NA 16.7 16.6 15.3 18.2 23.7 21.7
Workers not affected 8.6 9.1 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.7 11.0 15.1 12.6
Year
PROBABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT LOSS, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN 
WORKERS AFFECTED/NOT AFFECTED BY THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE (a) 
TABLE 3
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minimum wage losing their employment is systematically higher (between 7 and 9 pp 
higher than for the other group). This greater probability of employment loss may possibly 
not be exclusively related to the existence of the minimum wage; the following paragraphs 
aim to isolate the impact of this factor from the possible impact of other factors such as 
different characteristics of workers.
One significant factor that may explain the different impact the national minimum wage 
has on different groups of workers is the way in which productivity changes during one’s 
working life.10 As shown in Chart 3, which reflects wage performance in the period 2003-
200411 by gender and age, wage rises were higher among the intermediate age groups 
and lower both for younger and older workers. To the extent that this wage performance 
reflects productivity developments, it could be considered that those younger and older 
workers could be more affected by possible increases in the national minimum wage, as 
either group would find it difficult to achieve the productivity gains required to offset those 
increases.
To take into consideration this effect and, in general, all the other personal characteristics 
that may affect the probability of employment loss, a logit model12 has been estimated, 
including, among others, explanatory variables such as age, nationality, household size, 
type of contract, length of service and individual wage. In this model, the variable that re-
flects the impact of increases in the minimum wage is the negative gap between a worker’s 
current wage and the following year’s minimum wage. The sample used is limited to 16- to 
65-year-olds and to contribution groups 4 to 11. The first three columns of Table 4 show 
the estimated marginal effect of a €100 increase in the minimum wage on the probability 
of employment loss, distinguishing by gender and age.
The result is that increases in the national minimum wage have a positive and significant 
impact on the probability of workers in the group affected losing their employment, except 
for workers in the intermediate (25-32) age group. This effect is more pronounced for 
SOURCE: Social Security Administrative Labour Records (MCVL).
a The pro??e is similar for any period not affected by increases in the national minimum wage.
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10  In principle, productivity increases will differ by age group and will, therefore, affect the probability of employ-
ment loss differently.
11  Note that both Chart 3 and all the findings in this article relate to contribution groups 4 to 11, that is, to less-
skilled workers, as they are the ones most affected by increases in the national minimum wage. All other con-
tribution groups have a higher minimum contribution base, which means that potential increases in the na-
tional minimum wage do not affect them in the same way.
12  The dependent variable in the model is defined as the probability of employment loss on a 12-month horizon to 
avoid seasonality problems.
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younger workers, for whom the probability of employment loss rises by 7 pp, and espe-
cially for workers over 45, for whom the probability rises by 14 pp, in the event of a €100 
increase in the national minimum wage. These differences are consistent with the average 
wage increases seen in Chart 2, as the most pronounced effects are concentrated among 
those groups for which productivity gains are least likely to be sufficient to offset increases 
in the national minimum wage. The analysis by gender (columns 2 and 3 of Table 4) con-
firms these findings, showing that the effect in the 33-45 age group is due exclusively to 
female workers.
As discussed in the second section of this article, to the extent that the collective bargain-
ing process passes increases in the national minimum wage through to collective bar-
gained wages, there could be an indirect impact on a much broader group of workers. In 
an endeavour to reflect this impact, the last three columns of Table 4 present an estimation 
of a new model, similar to the previous one, but also including an estimated impact for 
persons who are not directly affected by increases in the national minimum wage but 
whose wages are sufficiently low so as to be potentially indirectly affected.13 The estima-
tions indicate that this indirect effect is also positive and significant for all age groups, al-
though less so than the direct effect of increases in the national minimum wage. Accord-
ingly, the findings suggest that increases in the national minimum wage passed through to 
collective bargained wages may have raised the individual probability of employment loss 
SOURCE: Social Security Administrative Labour Records (MCVL) (2005-2010).
NOTES: The control variables included are: year and month, age group, multiple job-holding, nationality, household size, type of contract, length of service and 
interaction month/gap between wage and national minimum wage.
??????????????????????
????????????????????
?????????????????????
a Only estimated for those workers whose real wage is lower than the following year's real minimum wage. 
b Only estimated for those workers whose real wage lies between the national minimum wage and 1.1x the following year's national minimum wage. This variable 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
Total Women Men Total Women Men
16-24 age group
7.6***
(2.05)
7.3**
(2.94)
9.32***
(2.95)
7.91***
(2.05)
7.59**
(2.94)
9.64***
(2.95)
25-32 age group
2.6
(1.99)
4.0
(2.82)
1.9
(2.89)
2.72
(1.99)
4.17
(2.82)
1.9
(2.89)
33-45 age group
5.129***
(1.97)
11.9***
(2.81)
2.0
(2.84)
5.32***
(1.97)
12.37***
(2.81)
2.0
(2.84)
Over 45 age 
group
14.199***
(2.05)
17.95***
(2.92)
9.2***
(2.94)
14.44***
(2.05)
18.43***
(2.92)
9.24***
(2.94)
16-24 age group ... ... ...
1.59***
(0.28)
0.89**
(0.42)
2.26***
(0.39)
25-32 age group ... ... ...
0.67***
(0.26)
0.77**
(0.34)
0.55
(0.4)
33-45 age group ... ... ...
1.69***
(0.25)
2.72***
(0.36)
0.52
(0.37)
Over 45 age 
group
… … …
3.19***
(0.33)
4.35***
(0.5)
1.21***
(0.45)
Gap between wage and 1.1x national 
minimum wage (b)
Gap between wage and national 
minimum wage (a)
Direct effect Direct and indirect effect
ESTIMATION OF A LOGIT MODEL ON THE PROBABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT LOSS. MARGINAL EFFECT 
OF A €100 INCREASE IN THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE 
TABLE 4
13  This second group of indirectly affected workers is defined as those whose wages are 1x-1.1x the following 
year’s national minimum wage.
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for this broader group of workers, but this effect would, in any case, be lower in quantita-
tive terms than the direct effect associated with increases in the national minimum wage.
To sum up, even though only a small group of workers is potentially affected by increases 
in the national minimum wage, the impact on the likelihood of their losing their employ-
ment is significant, especially for certain groups, such as younger workers, in keeping with 
the findings of previous studies, and workers over 45 and female workers in the intermedi-
ate age groups. Moreover, a larger overall effect cannot be ruled out, to the extent that 
increases in the national minimum wage are ultimately passed through to the rest of the 
wage distribution through the collective bargaining process.
12.12.2012.
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